In recent years, gay marriage has become an increasingly salient topic in American politics. Despite this, political scientists have paid surprisingly little attention to the question of when and how states come to provide the right to gay marriage. The limited existing literature on pro-
Introduction
In recent years the fight over gay marriage rights has evolved from an issue many members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender ( LGBT 1 ) community viewed as of minor importance, to one of the focus points of the gay rights movement. Indeed, the recent proliferation of gay marriage rights has been nothing short of dramatic: in a little more than one decade, the number of states that have begun providing marriage certificates to gay and lesbian couples has grown from zero to nineteen, with many additional states awaiting the outcome of judicial challenges to existing bans on same-sex marriage. 2 While it is possible that a future Supreme Court ruling (which may come as early as the spring of 2015) could settle the debate on gay marriage, up until now the issue has almost exclusively been decided on a state-by-state basis. However, despite the fact that gay marriage has become one of the most salient issues in American politics today, political scientists have paid relatively little attention to the question of when and how states come to provide the right of marriage to their gay and lesbian citizens.
[ FIGURE 1] In practical terms, there are three pathways states can follow to come to same-sex marriage rights: voters can approve the right to gay marriage through a referendum, courts within a state can rule that the failure to provide marriage certificates to gay and lesbian couples is unconstitutional, or a law creating marriage equality can be passed through a state's legislative process. As can be seen in Figure 1 and Table 1 , most states have legalized gay marriage through either a judicial ruling or the state legislative process. Since the Supreme Court's 2013 ruling in United States v. Windsor (which struck down the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)) there has been something of a switch in the paths taken: while the number of court cases challenging state bans on gay marriage has increased dramatically, the number of attempts at passing gay marriage bills through state legislatures has seemingly decreased. However, up until now the majority of states that have come to recognize the right to same-sex marriage have done so through their state's legislative process. As can be seen in Table 1 , of the nineteen states that currently have gay marriage rights, ten achieved it through action by its state legislatures. 3 [ But why do some states end up following the judicial and others the legislative path? And why has the focus of the marriage equality movement in recent months shifted more towards the judicial approach and away from the legislative one? To answer this question we present an attempt at identifying the circumstances under which gay marriage bills are likely to pass in state legislatures. By answering this question we not only expand our understanding of the circumstances under which pro-LGBT legislation passes in American legislatures, but also provide information that can explain why the legislative path to gay marriage may be more or less easily accessible at different times.
The existing literature on minority groups and legislative representation has argued that the key to producing substantive representation relies on the presence of descriptive representation. In other words, minority groups are more likely to receive benefits when they are represented in a legislature by one of their own. From this perspective, the presence of openly-
LGBT legislators would be the core explanatory variable indicating why states would follow the legislative path. 4 Other studies have argued instead that successful enactment of LGBT legislation relies on the presence of public support for LGBT issues. 5 In this article we will argue that while we find that these approaches provide valuable insight into the legislative process that has led to states passing laws legalizing same-sex marriage, they largely ignore a crucial variable. We argue that the role of political parties and party leaders in the legislative process is as important as the presence of openly-LGBT legislators or public support to achieving successful implementation of gay marriage bills. Specifically, we argue that the combination of Democratic majorities in both chambers of the legislature and control of the governorship produces the most favorable circumstances for gay marriage legislation to be passed.
In this paper we present a qualitative assessment of each case in which a state legislature has brought a bill legalizing gay marriage to a vote, regardless of whether the bill passed or failed. For each of these cases we collected data on the presence of openly-LGBT legislators, the partisan control of the legislature's assembly, senate, and governorship, and details on how the legislative process played out. We find that the presence of openly-LGBT legislators appears not to be a predictor of success or failure of a gay marriage bill once introduced, but that Democratic control of legislatures and governorships does increase the probability of success. This conclusion not only indicates the circumstances under which gay marriage bills are more or less likely to pass but also provides an effective explanation for why states have chosen different paths towards legalizing gay marriage, and provides insight as to how the future of the battle for and against gay marriage will evolve from here.
Gay Rights, Same-Sex Marriage, and American Politics
As an issue in American politics, gay marriage is a relatively recent addition, with neither politicians nor gay rights organizations devoting much attention to the concept of same-sex marriage until the middle of the 1990s. This is hardly surprising considering that a gay rights movement did not appear in the United States until the late 1960s. Indeed, as Michael J. Klarman has stated, in the first decades after World War II, any "movement for gay equality," let alone one focused on same-sex marriage rights, "faced daunting hurdles" 6 in that homosexuality was all but unanimously considered immoral and illegal: all states had criminalized private, consensual sex between same-sex partners. Anti-sodomy laws were frequently used as sufficient cause by police to raid gay bars and establishments. Additionally, gay and lesbian citizens faced prosecution in the form of intense employment discrimination if their sexuality was ever uncovered, with one notorious example of this type of exclusion being the federal government's response to the 'Lavender Scare' of the late 1940s. This 'scare' occurred in response to accusations that the Roosevelt and Truman administrations were harboring homosexual men in high positions and resulted in a witch hunt on gay and lesbian employees of federal government agencies. As a result, historian David K. Johnson has argued, between 1947 and the end of the 1960s at least 5,000 employees of different departments and agencies were fired based on their (perceived) sexual identity. 7 In addition to running the risk of random police raids and loss of job status, LGBT Americans throughout the 1940s, '50s and '60s faced an additional risk in the form of the medical community: with homosexuality categorized as a medical disease, in many states judges were authorized to involuntarily admit homosexuals to asylums where they could face brutal 'treatments' such as lobotomy, electroshock therapy, and castration. American city, the Stonewall case resonated strongly and inspired a more radical and community oriented gay rights movement in the form of organizations such as the Gay Liberation Front and countless similarly oriented organizations in major cities and on college campuses that became focused on openly demanding gay rights. 10 Despite this shift in organizational activity, during the 1970s and '80s, the gay rights movement would focus only to a small extent on the possibility of gay marriage. Although there were instances in the 1970s during which same-sex couples attempted to gain marriage certificates, the issue of same-sex marriage was by no means a focal point of the gay rights movement at the time. Instead, the gay rights movement predominantly focused on employment discrimination (inspired in part by attempts by conservative action groups to pass new legislation that would ban homosexuals from adopting or teaching in public schools) and building organizations such as LGBT community centers and gay student unions.
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As HIV-AIDS began to appear in gay communities in the early 1980s, the gay rights movement again switched focus, this time to issues related to providing healthcare to the many gay men who became victims of this new plague. While in the post-Stonewall era some organizations had already focused on providing social services to members of the LGBT community (including services focused on sexual health), 12 Clinton signed into law and even campaigned on during his re-election campaign. 15 But while the backlash to the Hawaii case set back the movement for gay marriage rights in the short term, it also introduced the concept of same-sex marriage into American political discourse. What followed was a now nearly two decade long process focused largely on judicial challenges against bans on same-sex marriage which, as Keck has argued, produced a series of victories that were followed (but not eclipsed) by a backlash against those successes in the form of referenda and legislative action. 16 The late 1990s and early 2000s in particular saw a series of judicial victories for gay marriage supporters: in 1999, Vermont's supreme court ruled that denying same-sex couples the right to marriage was unconstitutional, leading Governor Howard Dean (D-VT) to propose the creation of domestic partnerships. 17 In 2003, the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas ruled that a Texas law banning private, adult, consensual, same-sex sodomy was unconstitutional. 18 That same year, the Massachusetts supreme court in Goodridge v.
Department of Health ruled that barring same-sex couples from marriage was in opposition to the state's constitution, making Massachusetts the first state in the country to allow same-sex marriage. 19 Conservatives pushed back at the Goodridge and Lawrence decisions by calling for a federal constitutional amendment specifically defining marriage as between one man and one The existing literature that has assessed the likelihood of legislatures passing pro-LGBT legislation has largely done so by focusing on the importance of descriptive representation. From this perspective the presence of members of a minority group in a legislature represents a crucial variable in the legislative process that leads to the passage of laws that benefit members of this minority. 23 This phenomenon is not unique to the LGBT community. For example, studies have found that legislators who represent an ethnic or racial minority, or who are female, are more likely to introduce and support legislation consistent with their constituents' racial, ethnic or gender-based preferences. 24 Additionally, representation from members of a racial minority has been found to increase the likelihood of legislative assistance being offered to minorities' requests for constituency service. increase the probability of domestic partnership registration and other pro-LGBT benefits being implemented in cities and localities in the United States. 26 Haider-Markel finds evidence that the presence of LGBT lawmakers increases both the probability of LGBT laws being introduced and adopted, although he also finds that descriptive representation of the LGBT community causes an increase in the probability of the introduction and adoption of anti-LGBT legislation. 27 Finally, in a broader study of the role out-LGBT politicians play in American politics, HaiderMarkel finds that an increase in the number of openly gay state legislators results in a higher probability of pro-LGBT laws being introduced and passed. 28 Reynolds, who follows HaiderMarkel's basic model and assumptions, comes to similar conclusions in a comparative study of national legislatures, showing that the lagged presence of openly gay lawmakers in legislative bodies shows a significant positive correlation with the probability of pro-LGBT laws having been passed by this legislature. 29 While the literature presents a convincing argument as to the importance of the role individual openly-LGBT lawmakers play in the legislative process, we believe that the focus on descriptive representation alone ignores other crucial variables that can help explain why some state legislatures do and others do not succeed in passing gay marriage bills. It is certainly true that openly-LGBT lawmakers are at the forefront of the battles for pro-LGBT legislationwriting and introducing bills and lobbying other lawmakers in an attempt to change hearts and minds -but American state legislatures predominantly function through partisan control of the legislative agenda and individual lawmakers generally do not produce majority support for their bills through personal lobbying alone. As such, openly-LGBT lawmakers may increase the probability of pro-LGBT bills being introduced but their presence alone is unlikely to be sufficient to produce a positive outcome of the legislative process beyond that point.
An additional explanation for the success or failure of gay marriage bills lies in the level of public support that exists for same-sex marriage. Lax and Phillips have shown convincingly that in states in which there is a higher level of support among voters for issues such as gay rights, there is also a higher level of probability of legislation on those issues being enacted. 30 But while the connection between public support and political responsiveness represents a crucial electoral connection between voter and elected official, strong public support alone does not automatically produce the outcome a majority of voters desire: bills which a majority of the public strongly favors frequently fail, while bills which the majority appears to not care strongly about or even oppose frequently pass in American legislatures. For example, while opinion polls in the run-up to a 2012 vote on gay marriage in New Jersey indicated that 54 percent of voters supported gay marriage, a bill legalizing same-sex marriage still failed to be enacted. 31 While it would be foolish to dismiss either descriptive representation or public support for LGBT issues as influencing the outcome of these legislative processes, it is also clear that some other variable has an important impact on the probability of success and failure of same-sex marriage bills.
We therefore argue that for gay marriage bills to successfully pass a state legislature it is important that there is also strong support from a majority party for that bill. While individual legislators play important roles in writing, introducing, and lobbying for the passage of new pieces of legislation, the party-centered literature has provided us with an understanding that these actions alone generally do not produce successful attempts at passing laws. Instead, a bill is likely to pass under two specific conditions: first, a majority of a party must come to support an issue (which allows for a bill to be brought to a vote), and, second, that party must subsequently control the relevant veto positions in the legislative process, or have the ability to incorporate members of the minority party into a winning coalition so that the bill will actually pass.
In practical terms, for gay rights in the United States this means that successful implementation of pro-LGBT bills largely relies on support from a Democratic majority: as vetoed the bill. In response, the Democratic majorities in both houses succeeded in overturning the veto, making Vermont the first state to legalize gay marriage through a legislative process.
While both the assembly and senate included openly-LGBT members who campaigned actively for gay marriage legislation, the crucial variable that resulted in the successful overturning of the governor's veto was the role played by Democratic party leaders.
[ As can be seen in Table 2 . 38 Yet, in the case of Vermont this conclusion does not appear to be correct. As can be seen in Table 2 case, lawmakers such as Young were 'allowed' to vote against gay marriage when it first came up for a vote because their support was not necessary for the bill to pass the assembly. However, once the bill was vetoed and the Democratic leadership needed a higher number of votes to override the veto, Young's opposition became a threat to the party's ability to deliver on salient policy issues and he was pushed to change his vote.
However, the power parties have over their members is not absolute. Since members run for reelection on individual tickets, they may be willing to go against their party's preferences on bills that have high salience to voters and for which they fear reprisal at the ballot box if they go with their party. This means that, while the party can sometimes successfully push its members to vote differently from how they otherwise would have, it cannot always do so. Specifically on highly salient issues such as gay rights, then, a party may face considerable barriers to convincing its members to vote with the majority of the other members if these members sense that there is reason to believe that the opposite vote is a 'safer' vote for their own future reelection. This consideration works both ways: conservative Democrats, for example, may very well ignore pressure from their party's leadership and vote against a gay marriage bill while more liberal Republicans may ignore their party's leaders and vote in favor. On average, however, votes on gay marriage bills should be expected to largely fall across partisan lines.
The existing literature on the role parties play in the legislative process makes a strong case for incorporating their role in our attempts at understanding circumstances under which gay marriage bills can successfully pass. Based on the assumptions underlying the literature on the role of political parties in Congress and the descriptive representation literature, we can identify a set of expected circumstances under which gay marriage bills are more likely to succeed. The descriptive representation literature would predict that the introduction and subsequent passage of gay marriage bills are more likely to occur when openly-LGBT legislators are part of a legislature. The party literature produces a more extensive set of hypotheses: first, Democratic control of both chambers of the legislature should make it more likely for a gay marriage bill to be brought to a vote. Second, the combination of a Democratic majority in the legislature and a Democratic governor should make it more likely that a gay marriage bill that is brought to a vote will become law. Third, under the optimal combination of Democratic control of the legislature and governorship, failure to pass a gay marriage bill is likely to be caused by a subset of Democratic legislators who identify voting against the bill as a 'safer' choice. And fourth, support from Republican legislators can help in successfully passing gay marriage legislation but this support should be expected to come from legislators representing more moderate districts than the average Republican legislator in that state.
Methodology and Data
To test these hypotheses we collected data on each case in which a bill legalizing samesex marriage was brought to a vote in a state legislature in the United States, regardless of whether the bill subsequently passed or failed. 41 As can be seen in Finally, we collected information regarding the number of openly-LGBT legislators in the legislature (no openly-LGBT governors served at times when gay marriage bills were brought to a vote): for each case we searched through newspaper archives for members of legislatures who, at the time the bill was brought to a vote, had identified as openly gay. 45 To ensure we did not miss out on relevant legislators we conducted a second sweep consisting of a general internet search using a collection of keywords aimed at identifying legislators who, at the time a vote took place, were publicly out as gay or lesbian. For obvious reasons, this approach misses out on members of a legislature who are open about their sexual identity to their colleagues but not to voters, however the theory of descriptive representation gives us no reason to believe that those legislators would play an important role in pushing for the passage of a gay marriage bill.
In the section that follows we will present a qualitative assessment of each of the hypotheses based on the data collected in Table 3 . While we acknowledge the limitations inherent to our methodological choice and the scope of our case selection, we believe the approach chosen here will provide us with the ability to more effectively assess the role political parties played in each of these cases than we would have been able to in a large N study. This is particularly true considering the common critique that studies of the effect of party identity on legislative votes manage to show correlation but not causation. By focusing on a relatively small set of cases, we believe we can provide context that will help to identify not only that party and successful passage of same-sex marriage bills are correlated but also the circumstances under which bills we would expect to succeed or fail met those expectations, and when and why they did not.
Findings
The data collected in Table 3 LGBT member in the assembly), gay marriage supporters did succeed in passing same-sex marriage. Indeed, as can be seen in Table 4 , there is seemingly little reason to assume openly-
LGBT legislators are the crucial predictor for success or failure of gay marriage legislation.
Using a dichotomous variable to indicate the presence (or lack thereof) of LGBT legislators, we would expect Table 4 Republicans. 46 The partisan affiliation of governors also appears to be important: of the 11 states that passed gay marriage bills, 9 had Democratic governors who all signed the gay marriage bills into law. The two exceptions to this rule concern Governor Lincoln Chafee (I-RI), who was elected as an independent in 2010 but changed his party identification to Democrat the same month he signed the gay marriage bill into law, 47 and Governor Jim Douglas (R-VT) who vetoed the gay marriage bill but whose veto was overturned by the Vermont legislature. Of the seven cases in which gay marriage failed to pass, three failed due to a veto of the governor, each of which was a Republican (Governor Chris Christie (R-NJ) in 2012, and Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger (R-
CA) in 2005 and 2007). No Democratic governor has vetoed a gay marriage bill, and no
Republican governor has signed a gay marriage bill into law unless forced by a court ruling declaring an existing gay marriage ban unconstitutional. While the presence of a Democratic governor alone is not sufficient for a gay marriage bill to pass and the Vermont and Rhode Island cases show that it is, in itself, also not strictly necessary for a successful outcome to occur, it is nonetheless clear that i does greatly increase the probability of success.
[ To more effectively assess whether political parties actually affected the probability of success of gay marriage bills or whether the correlation is merely spurious we present basic information on each of the successful and failed attempts at passing bills that would legalize gay marriage. Table 5 shows each of the eleven cases in which gay marriage bills were enacted successfully. Of these 11 cases, eight had Democratic control of both chambers of the legislature and a Democratic governor. Of the three exceptions, two concerned the previously discussed cases of Rhode Island and Vermont. New York's legalization of gay marriage in 2011 concerns the only case in which Republicans controlled one chamber of the state legislature (in this case, the senate). While Republicans had the opportunity to block the gay marriage bill to come to a vote, New York's Democratic Governor Andrew Cuomo -assisted by the fact that a majority of senators (including four Republicans) had identified themselves as supporting gay marriage --managed to push the Republican Senate leadership to allow a vote to take place. 48 Of the seven cases in which a gay marriage bill was brought to a vote in at least one chamber of a state legislature but failed to become law, four concerned situations in which either a Republican majority in at least one of the legislature's chambers or the presence of a Republican governor prevented the bill from becoming law (see Table 6 ). However, in three cases the presence of a Democratic majority in the state legislature and a Democratic governor would have lead us to expect success but the bill failed nonetheless. In all three of these cases, this failure to pass the bill appears to have been caused by general unease among a minority of Democratic legislators that a yes vote for gay marriage was not the 'safe' vote -a clear downside to the situation of electoral capture LGBT voters find themselves in with regard to the Democratic Party.
[ Republicans with majority control of the state senate and the ability to block a scheduled vote on the gay marriage bill that had previously been passed by the assembly. 49 Additionally, efforts at lobbying conservative Democrats were complicated by the unpopularity of Governor David
Patterson and his strategic choice of pushing for a vote to be held regardless of a clear lack of majority support in the senate. 50 If our conclusions are correct, future attempts at passing gay marriage bills in American legislatures face two simultaneous developments that both increase and decrease the probability of success. On the one hand, opinion polls show that the number of Americans that support gay marriage continues to rise. 55 From this perspective, the legislative process of passing gay marriage bills should become less salient to most voters and legislators should become increasingly more comfortable to vote in favor of gay marriage. On the other hand, in states in which Democrats are unlikely to control the legislature and the governorship at the same time, the probability of legislative success remains slim regardless of recent developments in public opinion: until Republican voters will be fully incorporated in the shift in public opinion (and, as of now, they have not), Republican majorities and governors remain unlikely to support gay marriage bills.
This conclusion also explains why the future of the fight for gay marriage should largely be expected to be waged through courts rather than state legislatures. As can be seen in Table 7 [ 
